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Abstract
Large-scale marine protected areas (LSMPAs) have proliferated in recent years,
now accounting for most of the world’s MPA coverage. However, little is known
about LSMPA outcomes and the factors that affect them. Here we argue that pol-
icy interactions—the cumulative effect of co-existing policies for an issue and/or
geographical area—can play a critical, but under-recognized, role in influencing
LSMPAdesign and outcomes.We analyze interactions betweennational LSMPAs
within Palau and Kiribati, and regional fisheries management established by the
Nauru Agreement to show how policy actors can account for policy interactions
in LSMPA design, and to demonstrate the profound influence that policy inter-
actions can have on the economic and conservation outcomes of LSMPAS. We
draw on our analysis to distill lessons for our case studies and LSMPAs globally.
We emphasize that policy interactions are dynamic and malleable: they should
be proactively managed to stimulate synergy and address conflict. Understand-
ing and managing policy interactions is complex and context-specific, requir-
ing dedicated resources, cross-sectoral coordination, and sophisticated scientific
and practical policy expertise. To avoid undesirable consequences and capitalize
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on opportunities to secure multiple benefits, we recommend that policy actors
systematically evaluate, monitor, and adapt to policy interactions throughout
LSMPA design and implementation.
KEYWORDS
fisheries management, Kiribati, large-scale marine protected areas, marine conservation,
Nauru Agreement, Pacific Islands, Palau, Palau National Marine Sanctuary, Phoenix Islands
Protected Area, policy interactions
1 INTRODUCTION
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean encompasses the
world’s largest tuna fisheries. In 2017, they were worth
US$5.84 billion in landed value and accounted for 54%
of the global tuna catch (Williams & Reid, 2018). The
majority of the catch is taken within the national jurisdic-
tions of Pacific Island countries (PICs) by licensed foreign
fishing fleets (Hanich, 2012). While resource endowments
vary among countries, license fees from tuna fisheries
are critical for government revenues across the region
(Gillette, 2016). Recently, some PICs have designated
large-scale marine protected areas (LSMPAs) greater than
100,000 km2 (Friedlander et al., 2016), many of which
prohibit commercial fishing. No-take LSMPAs may seem
paradoxical to PICs’ objectives of re-asserting control over
their ocean territories to capture greater returns from
tuna fishing dominated by foreign firms (Silver et al.,
2015). However, for two PICs with LSMPAs in the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean—Palau and Kiribati—policy
interactions make these conservation and development
objectivesmore compatible than theymay otherwise seem.
Policy interactions are the cumulative effects of coexist-
ing policies for an issue and/or geographical area. Inter-
actions among policies at the same jurisdictional level or
across levels shape social and environmental outcomes
(Young, 2002). Policies may interact synergistically or in
tension; the type of interaction and its consequences vary
by context (Young, 2002). Policy interactions warrant spe-
cial attention in LSMPAs (Gruby et al., 2016). Due to
their extensive size, LSMPAs tend to interact with national
and international politics and policies in ways not typ-
ically seen in smaller MPAs closer to shore, leading to
unique and sometimes unexpected outcomes (Gruby et al.,
2017). For example, policies regarding high seas conserva-
tion, human rights, and territorial sovereignty intersected
in unexpected ways with LSMPA processes in Bermuda,
Rapa Nui (Easter Island), and the Commonwealth of
the Northern Marianas Islands, respectively, significantly
influencing their outcomes (Gruby et al., 2017). It can-
not be assumed that sector-based government agencies
or conservation-focused practitioners are systematically
accounting for or proactively managing the full suite of
policies that may meaningfully interact with LSMPAs and
substantially affect their outcomes (Rice et al., 2012). Pol-
icy interactions are under-studied and under-recognized—
but critical—in the global LSMPAmovement (Gruby et al.,
2016).
Where national LSMPAs overlap with tuna fisheries in
the Pacific, they interact with a pre-existing policy frame-
work for regional tuna management. Here we empirically
explore policy interactions between LSMPAs in Palau (the
PalauNationalMarine Sanctuary, PNMS) andKiribati (the
Phoenix Islands Protected Area, PIPA) and a regional fish-
eries management framework established by the Parties to
the Nauru Agreement for purse seine tuna fishing known
as the Vessel Day Scheme (hereafter: VDS). We focus on
the consequences of policy interactions for the design of
the PNMS and outcomes of both LSMPAs. Our selected
case studies are instructive for several reasons. First, PIPA
is one of the longest-establishedLSMPAs in theworld,with
a high global profile; the nascent LSMPAmovement looks
to PIPA for experience and lessons learned. Second, the
case studies themselves are of global interest in that they
consider outcomes of policy interactions for tuna conserva-
tion in a globally significant fishery. Third, the case study
approach is analytically powerful in allowing us to explore
how the same international policy interacts distinctly with
two national LSMPAs, revealing the importance of context
and actor agency in shaping policy interactions. We draw
on the experiences in Palau and Kiribati to raise the profile
of policy interactions in the LSMPAmovement, and to dis-
till lessons relevant for our case studies and LSMPAs glob-
ally regarding the importance, dynamics, malleability, and
complexity of policy interactions.
The article proceeds as follows: first, we describe objec-
tives of the VDS and LSMPAs. Then, we explain how
Palau strategically accounted for policy interactions in the
design phase of the PNMS to maintain its economic bene-
fits from the VDS. Next, we discuss how the policy interac-
tions affect outcomes of the LSMPAs related to tuna fish-
eries revenue, foreign compensation (inKiribati), and tuna
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conservation before summarizing our recommendations
for LSMPAs globally. Our analysis is informed by the
authors’ regional experience with LSMPAs and fisheries
policy, and primary data collected1 in Kiribati (2016) and
Palau (2015–2017). Data sources include policy documents
plus 47 interviews in Kiribati and 84 in Palau.
2 REGIONAL TUNAMANAGEMENT
Since 1982, eight PICs, including Palau and Kiribati, have
used a cooperative approach to fisheries management
through the Nauru Agreement. The Parties to the Nauru
Agreement2 (PNA) control ∼25% of global tuna catch,
including ∼50% of global skipjack (Bernadett, 2014). The
PNA’s most impactful fisheries management tool is the
VDS, implemented in 2007. Palau and Kiribati joined the
scheme in 2010 and 2012, respectively.
The VDS sets an annual total allowable effort (TAE):
the number of days that fishing vessels may fish within
PNA Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Each country is
allocated a Party Allowable Effort (PAE), a share of the
TAE. The PAE is determined through a flexible formula
based on historical catch and distribution of biomass in
EEZs (Aqorau, 2009). By limiting fishing days, the PNA
seeks to enhance sustainability while creating a scarcity
value for licenses (Havice, 2013). The PNA have further
increased the value of vessel days by agreeing to a mini-
mum price (Bernadett, 2014) and permitting members to
buy and sell (called “trading”) portions of their PAE among
one another. Vessels must fish their days in the EEZ of
the country from which they purchased them.3 The VDS
has dramatically increased licensing fee revenue and nego-
tiating power of small states with foreign fishing nations
and fleets (Havice, 2013; Yeeting et al., 2016) while stabiliz-
ing revenue that otherwise fluctuates with regional fishing
patterns (Hanich et al., 2018).
3 LARGE-SCALEMPAs IN PALAU AND
KIRIBATI
The PNMS (est. 2015) prohibits fishing in 80% of Palau’s
national waters as of 2020, and PIPA (est. 2008) has pro-
hibited fishing in 11% of Kiribati’s waters since 20154 (see
1 By a team led by Gruby, Gray, and Campbell.
2 Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu.
3 Exceptions to this include days purchased under the FSM Arrangement
that allows regional access, and historically, US Treaty fishing days (Hav-
ice, 2013, 2018).
4 Subsistence fishing is allowed around one inhabited island (0.6% of
LSMPA).
Figure 1). Objectives for both LSMPAs include marine
habitat and biodiversity conservation; food security;
and sustainable economic development through tourism,
international aid, and, in Palau, a domestic tuna fishery.
Both countries also hope the LSMPAs can contribute to
tunamanagement by protecting sites important for spawn-
ing or juveniles. Sovereignty is another important consid-
eration: LSMPAs aim to enhance surveillance and control
of EEZs. We take shared interests of the LSMPAs and VDS
in sustainable economic development and tuna conserva-
tion as a point of departure for exploring how the policy
interactions affect the design of the PNMS and outcomes
of both LSMPAs.
4 POLICY INTERACTIONS IN
LARGE-SCALEMPA DESIGN
Kiribati established PIPA in 2008 before joining the VDS in
2012, and its design therefore did not account for this spe-
cific policy interaction (it did consider impacts on fishing
revenue, discussed below). In contrast, the VDS played an
important role in the design of the PNMS (see Figure 2 for
a timeline).
In February 2014, Palau’s president announced plans for
an LSMPA that would ban commercial fishing throughout
Palau’s EEZ. This raised questions within Palau, including
how a full EEZ closure could affect Palau’s participation
in the VDS. About 6 months before the PNMS was legally
designated, the PNA CEO told the Palauan congress that
“Palau cannot declare its EEZ amoratorium, ban commer-
cial purse seining, and still be allowed to trade its [VDS]
days” (Letter from Transform Aqorau; April 19, 2015).
Though Palau’s economy relies primarily on tourism
(Wabnitz et al., 2018), revenue from foreign fishing is also
important, accounting for 12% of total government revenue
from 2014 to 2017 (PICRC&COS, 2019). The sale of foreign
fishing licenses is a particularly important source of consis-
tent revenue for Palau’s 16 states (RPPL No. 9–49 Subchap-
ter IV, Section 177). The bulk of Palau’s fishing revenue
comes through the VDS (PICRC and COS, 2019), mostly
earned by selling its days to other PNA members. In 2016,
Palau’s VDS allocation was worth $5.3 million (RoP, 2017).
The potential loss of revenue fromVDS tradingwas an eco-
nomic and political concern in the PNMS designation pro-
cess: the congress needed buy-in from state delegates to
pass the PNMS legislation.
These concerns, among other considerations, prompted
officials to design the PNMS so Palau could satisfy the
PNA and maintain their VDS allocations, while pursu-
ing additional objectives linked to an LSMPA. Local and
foreign experts as well as conservation NGOs were also
involved in the PNMS design process, including the Pew
4 of 9 GRUBY et al.
F IGURE 1 Map depicting spatial overlap in VDS management area and LSMPAs in Palau and Kiribati. Regarding the VDS area, fishing
days may be used only inside of PNA EEZs. Other PNA regulatory measures (such as high seas fishing closures) have been applied within the
broader VDS Area; however, the VDS and other PNA-related measures are not applied inside of non-PNA EEZs
F IGURE 2 Timeline of key events relating to the VDS and LSMPAs in Palau and Kiribati
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Charitable Trusts, Friends of the Palau National Marine
Sanctuary, and The Nature Conservancy. Various options
were considered. Ultimately, initial aspirations for a full
EEZ closure were reduced to 80%. The remaining 20% was
designated as a domestic fishing zone (DFZ) that required
fish to be landed in Palau and sold domestically; exports
were banned except for purse seine catch taken on free-
schools—an environmentally selective technique.5 In July
2015, three months before the PNMS was legally desig-
nated, the presidents of Palau and two other PNAcountries
sent a letter to fellow PNA members requesting “respect”
and “endorsement” of the PNMS and expressing Palau’s
“desire to maintain its PAE and continue to trade its allo-
cation with our PNA members.” The presidents argued
that the PNMS would not undermine the value of the
VDS and “will provide significant conservation benefits for
regional tuna conservation goals [. . . ] through the protec-
tion of juvenile tuna and associated/dependent species.”
Palauan officials we interviewed said that the PNA sup-
ported their continued allocation of vessel days. In sum-
mary, the interaction between the PNMS and VDS began
during the design phase of the PNMS, prompting a more
complex LSMPAdesign that enables Palau to remain a ben-
eficiary in the Western Pacific tuna fishery.
5 ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
The VDS helps offset fishing revenue losses from PNMS
and PIPA by allowing Palau and Kiribati to maintain and
trade their PAE days. At the time of this research, Palau
continues to sell themajority of its PAE to other PNA coun-
tries. The Palauan EEZ has never been a highly attrac-
tive fishing ground for purse seiners and is less so since
full implementation of the PNMS; the historically limited
purse seine fishing in Palau has since dwindled to zero.
Under the current PAE allocation formula, Palau’s PAE is
likely to decrease only slightly over time, because very little
of Palau’s allocation is based on fishing history; most has
come from the biomass provision of the formula. Future
revenue will be determined by a number of factors, includ-
ing the TAE across the PNA, value of vessel days, and tuna
biomass in Palau’s waters. But under the current agree-
ment, Palau continues to trade its PAE, retaining most of
its current vessel day allocation and revenue, despite clos-
ing 80% of its EEZ to fishing and having no domestic purse
5 To ensure the viability of the fishing industry and continued supply of
pelagic fish in Palau, the regulations have since been amended to change
the location and zoning of theDFZ; allow exports for longline vessels; pro-
vide for exemptions to the landing requirement; and exempt companies
from paying export taxes on fish caught outside of Palau that are domes-
tically landed for commercial export.
seine fishing. To further offset any reductions in tuna rev-
enue and fundPNMS implementation, Palauhas increased
visitor fees, fish export taxes, and attracted foreign aid.6
In Kiribati, the value of the VDS as an offset to economic
losses associated with PIPA is complicated by the initial
agreement to establish PIPA. Unlike Palau, Kiribati’s econ-
omy relies primarily on the sale of tuna licenses to for-
eign fleets (GoK 2016 Budget). Kiribati waters recorded the
largest tuna catch among Pacific fishing nations every year
from 2014 to 2018 (Reid, 2019). Thus, the economic impact
of an LSMPA in 11% of the EEZ was a critical question in
the development of PIPA, pre-VDS. Government represen-
tatives originally insisted that a no-take area was impossi-
ble unless foreign nongovernmental partners7 could offset
costs associated with protection.
As a result, the Government of Kiribati signed a conser-
vation contract with Conservation International and the
NewEnglandAquarium, establishing The Phoenix Islands
Protected Area Conservation Trust Fund (PIPATrust). The
contract obligated the partners to fund PIPA management
and to study potential revenue losses from fishing prohibi-
tions, in order to inform compensation decisions (Shelley,
2012). The PIPA Trust Act (2009) stipulates that the Trust
may compensate the government if there is revenue loss
associated with PIPA, to the extent agreed upon between
the Trust and government. A subsequent agreement in
2014 established a tuna working group to assess the costs
(and/or benefits) of PIPA’s full closure in 2015 (Rotjan et al.,
2014). As Shelley (2012, p. 515) notes, “it will be difficult to
settle on a number that is acceptable to everyone.”
Part of the difficulty in assessing economic loss arises
because the conservation contract was negotiated before
the implementation of the VDS. PIPA was first announced
in 2006. In 2008, the year PIPA was established, govern-
ment revenue from the sale of fishing licenses was $27.5
million USD (GoK 2016). Kiribati joined the VDS in 2012,
and by 2015, those revenues grew to a record $148.8 mil-
lion USD. Total catch in 2015 nearly matched the previ-
ous year and was higher than the annual total catch from
2006 to 2013, despite it being the first year of the PIPA
closure (GoK, 2016). Although there has been a modest
6 As of 2016, the PNMS received funding from TNC, Italy, Prince Albert of
Monaco Foundation, Shin Kong Hospital totaling $249,812; and commit-
ments from Oceans 5 of $850,000 and Taiwan of $1 million. Support for
marine surveillance comes primarily from the United States, Japan, and
Australia, including a commitment from The Sasakawa Peace Founda-
tion and Nippon Foundation valued at about $50 million (PNMS Annual
Report, 2016).
7 Conservation International and New England Aquarium were found-
ing NGO partners; each organization is named in the 2009 PIPA Conser-
vation Trust Act. Subsequently, Oceans 5, the Waitt Foundation, and the
Aquarium of the Pacific became involved through either providing fund-
ing support, and/or joining the board of the PIPA Trust.
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reduction in vessel-days and revenues in Kiribati since its
peak in 2015 during an El Niño fishing surge,8 the rela-
tive reduction in revenue is smaller than the decrease in
vessel days, with modeling suggesting that VDS trading is
offsetting revenue losses (Villaseñor-Derbez, Lynham, &
Costello, 2020)
These dynamics will affect decisions about compensa-
tion via the PIPA Trust. The VDS fundamentally changed
the context for the pre-existing conservation contract. If
Kiribati continues to sell its full allotment of VDS days,
it may be difficult to argue that PIPA has resulted in eco-
nomic losses unless it can be demonstrated that PIPA has
reduced the value or demand for access to Kiribati’s EEZ.
However, regardless of whether losses are incurred, there
is a perception among i-Kiribati officials that compensa-
tion and/or other economic benefits from PIPA should be
forthcoming as originally suggested (Mitchell, 2017). Many
interviewees inKiribati believe that PIPAhas benefited for-
eign NGO partners more than the people of Kiribati by ful-
filling a foreign conservation agenda and supporting the
careers of foreign scientists and conservationists (Mitchell,
2017). If the policy interactions contribute to an actual or
perceived loss of compensation, it could affect political
support for PIPA in Kiribati.
6 TUNA CONSERVATION OUTCOMES
The geography of fishing displacement by LSMPAs and
spatial ecology of tuna will shape the consequences of the
policy interactions for tuna conservation. Tuna are highly
mobile and capable of long-distance travel (Bucaram et al.,
2018). The interactions may be synergistic if the LSMPAs
are protecting sites that are ecologically important for tuna.
Spawning (pers. obs.) and nursery habitats (Filous et al.,
2020) of yellowfin tuna have been documented within
Palau’s EEZ. This supports Palau’s claim that regional tuna
stocks may benefit from the PNMS. Kiribati’s claim that
PIPA provides some protection for spawning has been con-
firmed (Hernández et al., 2019). However, tuna are known
to spawn across their ranges and more research is needed
to understand the importance of spatially fixed LSMPAs for
tuna (Bucaram et al., 2018; Koido & Suzuki, 1989).
Alternatively, the policy interactions are less beneficial
to tuna conservation if measured by reduced regional fish-
ing effort. In Palau, the interaction should maintain the
status quo of little to no commercial purse seine fish-
ing within Palau’s EEZ, and continued fishing of most of
Palau’s PAE in other PNA EEZs. In Kiribati, Villaseñor-
8 Pacific fishing surges occur at irregular intervals (e.g., in 1994, 1997, 2002,
and 2009), consistent with El Nino SouthernOscillation patterns (Hanich
et al., 2018; Lehodey, Bertignac, Hampton, Lewis, & Picaut, 1997).
Derbez et al. (2020) created a model that partly replicated
PNA conditions and suggested that vessels displaced from
PIPA have shifted to other PNAmember waters. Displace-
ment is also possible within Kiribati’s large EEZ. Critics
fault LSMPAs for displacing, rather than reducing, fish-
ing effort (Hilborn, 2018), illustrating that this is not a
problem specific to the PNMS or PIPA, or to its inter-
actions with the VDS. However, while neither PIPA or
PNMS necessarily intended to reduce fishing effort, the
VDS arguably makes fishing displacement easier through
regional trading, and more likely due to the value of the
fishery.
7 LESSONS FOR THE GLOBAL
LARGE-SCALEMPAMOVEMENT
We draw conclusions relevant for our case studies and
LSMPAs generally. It is not a given that LSMPA advo-
cates, managers, and other relevant policy actors are ade-
quately accounting for policy interactions. The first glob-
ally relevant lesson from this analysis is, therefore, that pol-
icy interactions can significantly influence the design and
outcomes of LSMPAs, and in context-specific ways. Palau
accounted for the VDS in designing the PNMS and, as a
result, maintains most of its fisheries revenue while clos-
ing 80% of its EEZ to fishing. The VDS also helps offset
economic losses of PIPA, although the profitability of the
VDS, which was implemented after the PIPA conservation
contract, could curtail expected revenue gains from com-
pensation via the PIPATrust. Impacts of policy interactions
for the LSMPAs’ tuna conservation goals are less clear. The
spatially flexible management of the VDS enables fishing
displacement both regionally and nationally. The policy
interactions are therefore unlikely to reduce fishing effort
below the regional TAE. However, the tuna conservation
benefits of LSMPAsmay dependnot on the quantity of fish-
ing, but where it takes place. The LSMPAs and VDS may
be complementary to the extent that the VDS helps make
large-scale conservation economically and politically fea-
sible and the LSMPAs enhance the sustainability of the
fishery by protecting ecologically significant areas. More
research is needed on PIPA and PNMS tuna conservation
outcomes at multiple scales.
More generally, we find that the policy interaction
broadens conservation and development opportunities
for Palau and Kiribati because it enables them to pur-
sue a new suite of objectives tied to their LSMPAs—for
example, food security, biodiversity and tuna conserva-
tion, tourism, domestic fishery development, enhanced
sovereignty—without sacrificing benefits derived from
fisheries. Whether they achieve their objectives remains
to be seen, but these findings challenge simple narratives
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of PICs as passive victims of ocean grabbing.9 In some
respects, the LSMPA and VDS policies may reflect Pacific
states exercising and strengthening sovereignty to claim
benefits of their resources that have long been exploited
by foreign fishing firms. However, LSMPAs in Kiribati and
Palau have been supported in part by foreign NGOs, and
there is a need to better understandwhat this kind of “artic-
ulated sovereignty” (Lunstrum, 2013) implies for state
and nonstate authority over ocean spaces and resources
(Campbell et al., 2016). Nonetheless, the experience of
Palau and Kiribati further illustrate how small island
(large ocean) states can leverage contemporary interest in
oceans as a conservation and development frontier to their
advantage (Silver & Campbell, 2018). What these findings
demonstrate for LSMPAs more generally is that analyzing
policy interactions is key to understanding the complex
outcomes of LSMPAs and the agency of individual states
in shaping them.
The second globally relevant lesson from this analysis
is that policy interactions affecting LSMPAs are dynamic
and malleable: they can be adjusted to stimulate syn-
ergy and address conflict. In Palau, the significance of the
LSMPA/VDS interaction emerged after the President pub-
licly announced his intention for a full EEZ closure. In dia-
logue with the PNA, and with the support of conservation
NGOs and experts, Palau strategically adapted its initial
vision to avoid conflictwith theVDS. There is also opportu-
nity to manage interactions that may emerge after LSMPA
designation. In Kiribati, the policy interaction arose years
after PIPA was designated. It will be critical that the PIPA
Trust further develop and clearly demonstrate benefits for
the people of Kiribati in order to maintain political sup-
port for PIPA. The PIPA Trust could proactively mitigate
political conflict by providing compensation regardless of
how theVDS affects economic costs of PIPA.More broadly,
if NGOs wish to help reduce regional fishing effort rather
than displace it, they could purchase portions of Palau’s
and Kiribati’s PAE, an option supported by PNA represen-
tatives and Palauan officials (Gruby et al., 2017). Policies in
other sectors, too, may be designed to account for LSMPAs.
ThePNA, for instance, could factor demonstrated regional-
scale conservation benefits into the calculation of PAEs
to reward countries that undertake conservation efforts to
benefit the region. Even more broadly, global actors must
ensure that conservation initiatives are compatible across
high seas and EEZs to avoid applying a disproportionate
conservation burden on coastal states. Our keymessage for
LSMPAs globally is that dynamic policy interactions need
9 Some scholars have raised concerns that LSMPAs may represent “ocean
grabs” that disempower governments, dispossess resource users, and
facilitate accumulation by foreign conservation actors (e.g., Mallin, Stolz,
Thompson, & Barbesgaard, 2019).
to be monitored and adaptively managed at all stages of
design and implementation.
The third globally relevant lesson from the case study
is that understanding policy interactions is complex. Ded-
icated resources, deliberate and proactive cross-sectoral
dialogue and coordinationwithin and across governments,
and sophisticated scientific and practical policy expertise
is necessary to understand and manage the full suite of
relevant policy interactions for LSMPAs. To illustrate this
point, we highlight the narrowly scoped focus of our anal-
ysis: we focus exclusively on how the VDS differentially
affects certain economic and tuna conservation outcomes
of PIPA and PNMS. However, even within the fisheries
sector, there are many other relevant policies (e.g., other
multilateral fishing agreements) and outcomes (e.g., on the
full range of affected fisheries and habitats) that we do
not consider. Additionally, we don’t assess outcomes for
PNA objectives beyond tuna conservation. For instance, do
the LSMPAs affect the value of vessel days? What would it
mean for the PNA if additional member states implement
LSMPAs?
To avoid undesirable unintended consequences, and
capitalize on opportunities to secure multiple benefits, we
recommend that policy actors conduct a strategic policy
analysis during the design phase of an LSMPA. The analy-
sis should cast a broad net and follow a transparent process
for examining the potential direct and indirect interactions
of conservation, fisheries, development, human rights, ter-
ritorial sovereignty, and other potentially relevant poli-
cies at all scales. A systems perspective, mixing creativ-
ity with deep policy experience and knowledge of local
context, should help uncover potential interactions that
can inform LSMPA design. However, policy interactions
are not always predictable; new policy interactions may
emerge after a LSMPA is designated or may only become
obvious during implementation. There is therefore a need
for ongoing monitoring and policy evaluation to guide an
adaptive approach to LSMPA governance that attends to
dynamic policy interactions. This is especially true where
LSMPAs interact with regional or international policies
that are outside of a given jurisdiction’s direct control. In
ongoing analyses, it will be critical to assess policy inter-
actions that are perceived or expected alongside those that
are realized, as both the interactions and perceptions about
them need to be managed to maintain political support for
the LSMPAs in the long term.
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